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ABSTRACT
Dierent from the traditional public key encryption, search-
able public key encryption allows a data owner to encrypt
his data under a user's public key in such a way that the
user can generate search token keys using her secret key and
then query an encryption storage server. On receiving such
a search token key, the server lters all or related stored
encryptions and returns matched ones as response.
Searchable pubic key encryption has many promising ap-
plications. Unfortunately, existing schemes either only sup-
port simple query predicates, such as equality queries and
conjunctive queries, or have a superpolynomial blowup in
ciphertext size and search token key size.
In this paper, based on the key-policy attribute-based
encryption scheme proposed by Lewko et al. recently, we
present a new construction of searchable public key encryp-
tion. Compared to previous works in this eld, our con-
struction is much more expressive and ecient and is proven
secure in the standard model.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
E.3 [Data Encryption]: Public Key Cryptosystems; H.3
[Information Storage and Retrieval]: Information Search
and Retrieval
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1. INTRODUCTION
Consider a user Bob who sends email to another user Al-
ice encrypted under Alice's public key. An email gateway is
congured to check whether emails contain the keyword\ur-
gent" so that it could route emails accordingly. On the other
hand, Alice does not wish to give the gateway the ability to
decrypt all her messages. Boneh et al. in [7] dene and con-
struct a mechanism { public key encryption with keyword
search (PEKS) that allows Alice to provide a token key to
the gateway so that the latter can test whether the word
\urgent" is a keyword in the email while without learning
anything else about the email.
In a PEKS scheme [7], to send an encrypted email message
msg with keywords s1; : : : ; sn to Alice, Bob computes
[EApub(msg)jjPEKS(Apub; s1)jj    jjPEKS(Apub; sn)];
where Apub is Alice's public key. After Alice submitting a
token key TKs0 for keyword s
0, the email gateway can decide
whether this encrypted message matches with TKs0 by test-
ing each keyword encryption PEKS(Apub; si) against TKs0
iteratively. If there exists si satisfying si = s
0, the gate-
way deems that the entire encrypted message is matched
and then takes appropriate actions on the email accordingly.
The rst part of the ciphertext above, i.e., EApub(msg), is
normally ignored when studying a PEKS scheme, since its
security can be achieved via the traditional public key en-
cryption. Except stated explicitly, ciphertexts of a public
key encryption with keyword search scheme consist of only
the keyword encryptions. Therefore, informally, the basic
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security requirement for a public key encryption with key-
word search is that the email gateway or the storage server
does not learn any information about encrypted keywords
unless it has the knowledge of a matched token key.
The PEKS scheme in [7] only supports equality queries.
However, more expressive search lters, e. g., conjunctive
keywords or even boolean formulas, are required in many
applications. For comparability, we use the email gateway
application scenario in [7] to illustrate this. Two typical
expressive search lters at the gateway may look like:
Eg. 1: sender: Bob AND priority: urgent
Eg. 2: (sender: Bob AND priority: urgent) OR subject: re-
cruitment
where the rst example means that Alice wants the email
gateway to return all urgent emails sent by Bob, and the
second one means that all emails either sent by Bob with
urgent priority or having a subject of recruitment should be
forwarded to Alice.
With regard to the conjunctive keyword search problem
presented by Eg. 1, security concerns and high storage over-
head (i.e., storage overhead is exponential in the number
of keyword elds) overrule two straightforward solutions,
namely set intersection and meta keywords [26, 16]. The
set intersection is built upon simple PEKS scheme, such as
the one in [7]. Given a conjunction of keywords, the gate-
way is provided with a search capability for every individual
keyword in the conjunction. For every keyword, the gateway
nds the set of ciphertexts that match that keyword, then
returns the intersection of all the sets. This approach allows
the gateway to learn a lot of extra information in addition
to the results of the conjunctive query. The meta keyword
approach is to dene a meta keyword for every possible con-
junction of keywords. These meta keywords are then as-
sociated with messages like regular keywords. The obvious
drawback of this approach is that m keywords require 2m
meta keywords in order to accommodate all possible con-
junctive queries. We refer interested readers to [26, 16] for
more details.
The schemes proposed in [26, 19, 10, 20, 33] solve the con-
junctive keyword search problem in the public-key setting.
Especially, Boneh and Waters [10] present a general frame-
work for analyzing and constructing searchable public key
encryption (S-PKE)1 schemes for various families of pred-
icates. Boneh and Waters [10] then construct public key
encryption schemes that support comparison queries (such
as greater-than) and general subset queries. They also sup-
port arbitrary conjunctions. However, to the best of our
knowledge, except S-PKE schemes constructed from inner-
product predicate encryption [20], existing schemes mostly
focus on conjunctive keyword search and do not work in the
situations involving keyword disjunction, such as Eg. 2.
The notion of inner-product predicate encryption (IPE)
is rst introduced by Katz et al. [20]. In a predicate en-
cryption scheme, secret keys correspond to predicates and
ciphertexts are associated with a set of attributes; a secret
key SKf corresponding to a predicate f can be used to de-
crypt a ciphertext associated with an attribute set I if and
1S-PKE is a generalization of PEKS. PEKS refers to public
key encryption supporting simple encrypted keyword search
predicates such as equality queries while S-PKE refers to
public key encryption supporting more expressive keyword
search predicates.
only if f(I) = 1. The special case of inner product predi-
cates is obtained by having each attributes set correspond
to a vector ~x and each predicate f~v correspond to a vector
~v, where f~v(~x) = 1 i ~x  ~v = 0 (~x  ~v denotes the standard
inner-product). IPE can be extended to construct a solu-
tion to disjunctive keyword search. However, as shown in
[20], the solution has a superpolynomial blowup in cipher-
text size and search token key size, thus is not ecient. As
described in [20], the conjunction predicate ANDs1;s2 where
ANDs1;s2(x1; x2) = 1 i both x1 = s1 and x2 = s2, and
the disjunction predicate ORs1;s2 where ORs1;s2 = 1 i ei-
ther x1 = s1 or x2 = s2, can be encoded as the following
bi-variate polynomials
ANDs1;s2 : p
0(x1; x2) = r  (x1   s1) + (x2   s2),
ORs1;s2 : p
00(x1; x2) = (x1   s1)  (x2   s2),
where r in the rst polynomial is a random element chosen
from a proper domain. Following this principle, we could
easily encode Eg. 2 as a tri-variate polynomial
Eg.2s1;s2;s3(x1; x2; x3)
= (r  (x1   s1) + (x2   s2))  (x3   s3)
= 0  x1x2x3 + 0  x1x2 + r  x1x3 + 1  x2x3
+( rs3)  x1 + ( s3)  x2 + ( rs1   s2)  x3
+s3(rs1 + s2);
where s1; s2; s3 denote \sender: Bob", \priority: urgent"and
\subject: recruitment", respectively. To support the search
type in Eg. 2, the sender Bob could take advantage of IPE
to encrypt his email with the vector ~x = (x1x2x3; x1x2; x1x3,
x2x3; x1; x2; x3; 1), where x1; x2; x3 are keywords in the email;
the receiver Alice generates her token key using the predicate
vector ~v = (0; 0; r; 1; rs3,  s3; rs1 s2; s3(rs1+s2)) (i.e.,
the coecients of the above equation). Obviously, the gate-
way can successfully match Alice's query to the encrypted
email as long as the search lter Eg. 2 is satised. As
pointed out in [20], the complexity of the resulting scheme
is proportional to dt, where t is the number of variables and
d is the maximum degree (of the resulting polynomial) in
each variable.
These facts motivate us to construct an ecient public
key encryption supporting expressive search.
1.1 Our Contribution
In this paper, based on the key-policy attribute-based en-
cryption (KP-ABE) scheme proposed by Lewko et al. [22]
recently, we present an ecient construction of a S-PKE
scheme which supports arbitrary monotone boolean predi-
cate, such as Eg. 1 and Eg. 2. We prove that our scheme
is secure in the standard model. Inheriting from [22], our
scheme has the restriction that each keyword eld can only
be used once in a predicate.
In a KP-ABE scheme [30, 17], every ciphertext is associ-
ated with a set of attributes (i.e., keywords in S-PKE), and
every user's secret key is associated with an access structure
on attributes (i.e. search predicate in S-PKE). A user is able
to decrypt a ciphertext only if the set of attributes associated
with the ciphertext satises the access structure associated
with the user's private key. However, the attributes (i.e.,
keywords) associated with ciphertexts in existing KP-ABE
scheme, including Lewko et al. 's KP-ABE scheme [22], is
not anonymous, thus a KP-ABE scheme can not be used
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as S-PKE. In our S-PKE scheme, the ciphertext does not
reveal any information about the keywords. In fact, our
S-PKE scheme can be easily extended to obtain the rst
ecient anonymous KP-ABE scheme, in which given a ci-
phertext a probabilistic polynomial time adversary cannot
learn any information about the associated attribute set.
1.2 Related Work
In this section, we briey review literature on searchable
public key encryption.
Boneh et al. [7] initiate the research on PEKS and give
a specic construction, known as the BDOP-PEKS scheme,
which only supports equality queries. Abdalla et al. [1] for-
mally dene the property of consistency for PEKS, and state
the relation between PEKS and anonymous identity based
encryption (IBE). Based on dierent techniques or condi-
tions, several PEKS constructions, also supporting equality
queries, are presented in [13, 21, 5]. Noticing that the en-
cryption in BDOP-PEKS and its followings is not invertible,
Fuhr and Paillier [15] introduce the ability of decryption to
searchable encryption (DSE) in which the receiver is allowed
to decrypt the keyword ciphertext using an additional de-
cryption algorithm.
Park et al. [26] propose the notion of public key encryp-
tion with conjunctive keyword search (PECK), then Hwan
and Lee [19] make improvement on the sizes of ciphertext
and private key, and extend the technique to multi-user set-
ting. Zhang and Zhang [33] study a similar problem, namely
conjunctive with subset keywords search (PECSK). Bringer
et al. [11] take advantage of Bloom Filter [6] to construct
an error-tolerant searchable encryption, permitting to search
on encrypted data with only an approximation of some key-
words. Boneh and Waters [10] present a general framework
for analyzing and constructing S-PKE for various families of
predicates and construct several schemes that support arbi-
trary conjunctions. Katz et al. [20] propose the notion of
inner-product predicate encryption (IPE), which can be ex-
tended to construct S-PKE with disjunctive keyword search.
However, as shown in [20], the resulting solution suers from
a superpolynomial blowup in ciphertext size and search to-
ken key size.
In addition to designing schemes with more expressive
search criteria, there are also eorts [2, 34] studying the
combination of a public key encryption (PKE) scheme and
a PEKS scheme. Baek et al. [2] call their proposed scheme
\PKE/PEKS" and dene its security against chosen cipher-
text attack (IND-PKE/PEKS-CCA). The resulting construc-
tion is based on a variation of ElGamal encryption and
BDOP-PEKS, and is proved secure in the random oracle
model. Zhang and Imai [34] give a generic construction
which is based on secure PEKS schemes and tag-KEM/DEM
schemes, and is proved secure without random oracles.
Some literature aim at enhancing the original security def-
inition of PEKS in [7]. Byun et al. [12] dene o-line key-
word guessing (KG) attacks and show that BDOP-PEKS
is insecure against KG attacks unless there exists a secure
channel between the receiver and the server (i.e., the stor-
age server or the email gateway). PEKS schemes which are
immune to KG attacks (namely PEKS with a designated
server, dPEKS for short [29] and its enhancement [27], or
secure channel free PEKS, SCF-PEKS for short [3, 18, 14])
have also been reported in the literature. Tang and Chen
[32] provide another approach to resist KG attacks, but their
construction seems more like a searchable encryption scheme
in the private-key setting. The security of the search token
key (trapdoor), which ensures an adversary cannot learn the
search criteria from a token key generated by the receiver,
is discussed in [9, 28] and it is known that such a security
notion can only be achieved in the private-key setting [31].
We omit the literature on searchable encryption in the
private-key setting since they are outside the scope of this
paper.
1.3 Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
gives some preliminaries and formally denes security of our
S-PKE. Section 3 describes the proposed construction and
its security proof. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. PRELIMINARIES
If S is a set, then s
$ S denotes the operation of picking
an element s uniformly at random from S. Let N denote
the set of natural numbers. If  2 N then 1 denotes the
string of  ones. Let z  A(x; y; : : :) denote the operation
of running an algorithm A with inputs (x; y; : : :) and output
z. A function f() is negligible if for every c > 0 there exists
a c such that f() < 1=
c for all  > c.
2.1 Access Structures
Definition 1 (Access Structure [4]). Let fP1, : : :,
Png be a set of parties. A collection A  2fP1;:::;Png is
monotone if 8B;C : if B 2 A and B  C, then C 2 A. An
access structure (respectively, monotone access structure) is
a collection (respectively, monotone collection) A of non-
empty subsets of fP1; : : : ; Png, i.e., A  2fP1;:::;Pngnf;g.
The sets in A are called authorized sets, and the sets not in
A are called unauthorized sets.
In our context, keywords play the role of parties and we
restrict our attention to monotone access structures (i.e.,
search predicates). It is possible to (ineciently) realize
general access structures using our techniques by treating
the negation of a keyword as a separate keyword.
2.2 Linear Secret Sharing Schemes
Our construction will employ linear secret-sharing schemes
(LSSS). We use the denition adapted from [4]:
Definition 2 (Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes). A
secret sharing scheme  over a set of parties P is called lin-
ear (over Zp) if
1. The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
2. There exists a matrix A with ` rows and n columns
called the share-generating matrix for . For all i =
1; : : : ; `, the ith row of A is labeled by a party (i) (
is a function from f1; : : : ; `g to P). When we consider
the column vector v = (s; r2; : : : ; rn), where s 2 Zp is
the secret to be shared, and r2; : : : ; rn 2 Zp are ran-
domly chosen, then Av is the vector of ` shares of the
secret s according to . The share (Av)i belongs to
party (i).
It is shown in [4] that every linear secret-sharing scheme
according to the above denition also enjoys the linear re-
construction property, dened as follows. Suppose that 
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is an LSSS for the access structure A. Let S 2 A be any
authorized set, and let I  f1; : : : ; `g be dened as I =
fij(i) 2 Sg. Then there exist constants f!i 2 Zpgi2I such
that, if fig are valid shares of any secret s according to ,
then
P
i2I !ii = s. Let Ai denotes the i
th row of A, we
have
P
i2I !iAi = (1; 0; : : : ; 0). These constants f!ig can be
found in time polynomial in the size of the share-generation
matrix A [4]. Note that, for unauthorized sets, no such con-
stants f!ig exist.
Boolean Formulas Access structures (i.e., search predi-
cates) might also be described in terms of monotonic boolean
formulas. Using standard techniques [4] one can convert any
monotonic boolean formula into an LSSS representation. We
can represent the boolean formula as an access tree. An ac-
cess tree of ` nodes will result in an LSSS matrix of ` rows.
We refer the reader to the appendix of [24] for a discussion
on how to perform this conversion.
2.3 Searchable Public Key Encryption
During the rest of the paper, we follow the general frame-
work and notation for S-PKE as dened in [10]. Suppose a
user Bob is about to send an encrypted document to Alice
with keywords s1; : : : ; sn, where n is the number of keyword
elds. If documents were emails for example, we could dene
4 keyword elds, such as\From",\To", \Date"and\Subject".
Bob sends the following message:
[EApub [msg]; S-PKE(Apub; (s1; : : : ; sn))];
where Apub is Alice's public key, msg is the email body, and
S-PKE is an algorithm with properties discussed below. To
simplify the description, we ignore EApub [M ] that can be
encrypted with any secure public key encryption.
Without loss of generality, we assume that all keyword
elds are dened for every document, as employed in [16].
From here onwards, we identify a document with the vector
of n keywords. We denote a document by D = (s1; : : : ; sn),
where si is the keyword of document D in the i
th keyword
eld. A S-PKE scheme consists of the following four algo-
rithms:
Setup(1) takes as input a security parameter  and outputs
a public key PK and secret key SK.
Encrypt(PK;D = (s1; : : : ; sn)) takes as input the public key
PK and a document D = (s1; : : : ; sn) and outputs a
ciphertext CD.
GenToken(PK;SK;P) takes as input the public key PK, the
secret key SK and a predicate P and outputs a token
key TKP .
Test(PK;TKP ; CD) takes as input the public key PK, a to-
ken key TKP  GenToken(PK; SK;P) and a ciphertext
CD  Encrypt(PK;D = (s1; : : : ; sn)). It outputs \yes"
if the keywords (s1; : : : ; sn) satises the predicate P
(i.e., P(D) = 1) and \no" otherwise.
We now give the security model for S-PKE in the sense of
semantic-security. We need to ensure that an S  PKE:Encrypt
(Apub;D = (s1; : : : ; sn)) does not reveal any information
about D unless TKP with P(D) = 1 is available. We de-
ne security against an active attacker who is able to ob-
tain token keys TKP for any P of his choice. Even under
such attack the attacker should not be able to distinguish an
encryption of a document D0 from an encryption of a doc-
ument D1 for which he did not obtain the token key TKP
such that P(D0) = 1 or P(D1) = 1. Formally, we dene se-
curity against an active attacker A using the following game
between a challenger and the attacker:
Setup: The challenger runs Setup(1) to obtain a public
key PK and secret key SK. It gives the public key PK
to the adversary A and keeps SK to itself.
Query phase 1: The adversary A adaptively queries the
challenger for token keys corresponding to predicates
P1; : : : ;Pq. In response, the challenger runs TKPi  
GenToken(PK; SK; Pi) and gives the token key TKPi
to A, for 1  i  q.
Challenge: The adversaryA submits two documents D0;D1,
subject to the restriction that, D0 and D1 cannot sat-
isfy any of queried predicates. The challenger selects
a random bit  2 f0; 1g, sets CD  Encrypt(PK;D)
and sends CD to the adversary as its challenge cipher-
text.
Query phase 2: The adversary continues to adaptively query
the challenger for token keys corresponding to predi-
cates with the added restriction that none of these can
be satised by D0 or D1.
Guess: The adversary A outputs its guess 0 2 f0; 1g for 
and wins the game if  = 0.
The advantage of the adversary in this game is dened as
jPr[ = 0]   1=2j where the probability is taken over the
random bits used by the challenger and the adversary.
Definition 3. A S-PKE scheme is secure if all polyno-
mial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in
this security game.
2.4 Composite Order Bilinear Groups
We will construct our scheme in composite order bilinear
groups whose order is the product of four distinct primes.
Composite order bilinear groups were rst introduced in [8].
Let G be an algorithm that takes as input a security
parameter 1 and outputs a tuple (p1; p2; p3; p4;G;GT ; e),
where p1; p2; p3; p4 are distinct primes, G and GT are cyclic
groups of order N = p1p2p3p4, and e : GG! GT is a map
such that
1. (Bilinear) 8g; h 2 G; a; b 2 ZN ; e(ga; hb) = e(g; h)ab;
2. (Non-degenerate) 9g 2 G such that e(g; g) has order
N in GT .
We further require that multiplication in G and GT , as
well as the bilinear map e, are computable in time poly-
nomial in . We use Gp1 ;Gp2 ;Gp3 ;Gp4 to denote the sub-
groups of G having order p1; p2; p3; p4, respectively. Observe
that G = Gp1 Gp2 Gp3 Gp4 . Note also that if g1 2 Gp1
and g2 2 Gp2 then e(g1; g2) = 1. A similar rule holds when-
ever e is applied to elements in distinct subgroups.
We now state the complexity assumptions we use. Utiliz-
ing the theorems proposed in [20], one can easily to prove
that the assumptions hold in the generic group model.
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Assumption 1. Let G be as above. We dene the follow-
ing distribution:
(p1; p2; p3; p4;G;GT ; e) G(1); N = p1p2p3p4;
g
$ Gp1 ; X3 $ Gp3 ; X4 $ Gp4 ;
D = (G;GT ; N; e; g;X3;X4);
T1
$ Gp1 Gp2 ; T2 $ Gp1 :
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 1
is dened as
Adv1A = jPr[A(D;T1) = 1]  Pr[A(D;T2) = 1]j:
Definition 4. we say G satises Assumption 1 if for any
polynomial time algorithm A, Adv1A is negligible.
Assumption 2. Let G be as above. We dene the follow-
ing distribution:
(p1; p2; p3; p4;G;GT ; e) G(1); N = p1p2p3p4;
g;X1
$ Gp1 ; X2; Y2 $ Gp2 ; X3; Y3 $ Gp3 ; X4 $ Gp4 ;
D = (G;GT ; N; e; g;X1X2; Y2Y3; X3; X4);
T1
$ Gp1 Gp2 Gp3 ; T2 $ Gp1 Gp3 :
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 2
is dened as
Adv2A = jPr[A(D;T1) = 1]  Pr[A(D;T2) = 1]j:
Definition 5. we say G satises Assumption 2 if for any
polynomial time algorithm A, Adv2A is negligible.
Assumption 3. Let G be as above. We dene the follow-
ing distribution:
(p1; p2; p3; p4;G;GT ; e) G(1); N = p1p2p3p4;
s
$ ZN ; g; h $ Gp1 ; g2; X2 $ Gp2 ;
X3
$ Gp3 ; X4; Z0 $ Gp4 ; B24; D24 $ Gp2 Gp4 ;
D = (G;GT ; N; e; g; g2; hX2; hZ0; gsB24;X3;X4; T );
T1 = h
sD24; T2
$ Gp1 Gp2 Gp4 :
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 3
is dened as
Adv3A = jPr[A(D;T1) = 1]  Pr[A(D;T2) = 1]j:
Definition 6. we say G satises Assumption 3 if for any
polynomial time algorithm A, Adv3A is negligible.
3. OUR PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION
Recall that a document D is identied by a vector of n
keywords (s1; : : : ; sn), where si is the keyword of document
D in the ith keyword eld. For notational purposes, let i
denote the ith keyword eld. Our S-PKE scheme supports
arbitrary monotone boolean predicate. We express an mono-
tone boolean predicate by an LSSS (A; ; T ), where A is a
`m share-generating matrix,  is a map from each row of
A to a keyword eld (i.e.,  is a function from f1; : : : ; `g to
f1; : : : ; ng), T can be parsed as (t(1); : : : ; t(`)) and t(i) is
the value (i.e., keyword) of keyword eld (i) specied by
the predicate.
Using our notations, a document D = (s1; : : : ; sn) satises
a predicate (A; ; T ) if and only if there exist I  f1; : : : ; `g
and constants f!igi2I such thatX
i2I
!iAi = (1; 0; : : : ; 0) and s(i) = t(i) for 8i 2 I;
where Ai denotes the i
th row of A. We also say that I 
f1; : : : ; `g satises (A; ) if there exist constants f!igi2I
such that
P
i2I !iAi = (1; 0; : : : ; 0). We dene IA; as the
set of minimum subsets of f1; : : : ; `g that satises (A; ).
By \minimum", we mean the subset cannot become smaller
while still satisfying (A; ).
The proposed S-PKE scheme consists of the following al-
gorithms:
Setup(1): The setup algorithm rst runs G(1) to obtain
(p1; p2; p3; p4;G;GT ; e) with G = Gp1  Gp2  Gp3 
Gp4 , where G and GT are cyclic groups of order N =
p1p2p3p4. Next it chooses g; u; h1; : : : ; hn 2 Gp1 , X3 2
Gp3 , X4; Z; Z0; Z1; : : : ; Zn 2 Gp4 and  2 ZN uni-
formly at random. The public key is published as PK =
(N; gZ; e(g; g); U = uZ0; fHi = hi  Zig1in; X4).
The secret key is SK = (g; u; h1; : : : ; hn;X3; ).
Encrypt(PK;D = (s1; : : : ; sn) 2 ZnN ): This encryption algo-
rithm chooses s 2 ZN and Z1;0; fZ1;ig1in 2 Gp4
uniformly at random. The corresponding ciphertext
CD = ( eC;C0; fCig1in) is computed aseC = e(g; g)s; C0 = (gZ)s Z1;0; Ci = (UsiHi)s Z1;i:
GenToken(PK; SK;P = (A; ; T )): Suppose A is an `  m
matrix,  is a map from each row Aj of A to f1; : : : ; ng
and T = (t(1); : : : ; t(`)) 2 Z`N . The key genera-
tion algorithm chooses a random vectors v 2 ZmN such
that 1  v = . (Here, 1 denotes the vector with the
rst entry equal to 1 and the rest equal to 0). For
each row Aj of A, it chooses a random rj 2 ZN and
random elements R1;j ; R2;j 2 Gp3 . The token key
TKP = ((A; ; T ); fK1;j ;K2;jg1j`) is computed as
K1;j = g
Aj v(ut(j)h(j))
rjR1;j ; K2;j = g
rjR2;j :
Test(PK;TKP ; CD): Let CD = ( eC;C0; fCig1in) and TKP =
((A; ; T ); fK1;j ;K2;jg1j`). The test algorithm rst
calculates IA; from (A; ), where IA; denotes the set
of minimum subsets of f1; : : : ; `g that satises (A; ).
It then checks if there exists an I 2 IA; that satiseseC =Y
i2I
(e(C0;K1;i)=e(C(i);K2;i))
!i ;
where
P
i2I !iAi = (1; 0; : : : ; 0). If no element in IA;
satises the above equation, it outputs \no". Other-
wise, it outputs \yes".
3.1 Efficiency
The size of the public key, a token key and a cipher-
text are (n + 3)jGj + jGT j, 2`jGj and (n + 1)jGj + jGT j,
respectively, where jGj and jGT j are the lengths of the bit-
representation of a group element in G and GT respectively.
Compared with expressive searchable public key encryption
scheme constructed from IPE [20], the size of a ciphertext
(resp. a key) in our scheme is linear with the number of
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keyword elds n (resp. the size of the search predicate), not
superpolynomial.
For a search predicate (A; ; T ), let 1 = jIA;j, IA; =
fI1; : : : ; I1g and 2 = jI1j +    + jI1 j. The computational
costs of an encryption, and a test under (A; ; T ) are (n +
1)tG m e+ tGT e and  22tp+ 1tGT m e, respectively, where
tp, tGT e, tG m e and tGT m e are the computational costs of
bilinear map, exponentiation in GT , multi exponentiation in
G and GT , respectively.
3.2 Discussion
Our S-PKE scheme is based on the KP-ABE scheme [22]
proposed by Lewko et al. . Since the attributes (i.e., key-
words) in Lewko et al. 's KP-ABE scheme [22] is not anony-
mous, it is not enough to obtain a secure S-PKE. On the
contrary, our S-PKE scheme can be easily extended to obtain
the rst ecient anonymous KP-ABE scheme. We remark
that the KP-ABE scheme in [22] works in a small universe
of attributes, while the keywords in our S-PKE scheme have
a large universe (i.e., ZN ).
Similar to the KP-ABE scheme in [22], our proposed S-
PKE scheme has the restriction that each keyword eld can
only be used once in a predicate, which is called one-use S-
PKE. We can obtain a secure S-PKE scheme where keyword
elds are used multiple times (up to a constant number of
uses xed at setup) from a one-use scheme by applying the
generic transformation given in Lewko et al. [22]. While
the transformation does incur some cost in public key and
ciphertext size, it does not increase the size of the token
key. Utilizing the techniques proposed by Lewko and Waters
[25] recently, it is possible to eliminate the above mentioned
eciency loss and allow unrestricted use of keyword elds
while still proving security in the standard model.
3.3 Security
Note that in our construction, all components of the pub-
lic key (except e(g; g)) and the ciphertext (except eC =
e(g; g)s) have a Gp4 part. This formation allows us to
prove that the ciphertext CD does not reveal any informa-
tion about D unless TKP with P(D) = 1 is available; it does
not aect the test algorithm, since no component in a token
key has a Gp4 part. We now state the security theorem of
our S-PKE scheme.
Theorem 1. If Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold, then the
proposed S-PKE scheme is secure.
Proof. Following the approach by Lewko and Waters
[23], we dene two additional structures: semi-functional ci-
phertexts and semi-functional keys. These will not be used
in the real system, but will be used in our proof.
Semi-functional Ciphertext Let g2 denote a generator of
the subgroup Gp2 . A semi-functional ciphertext is created
as follows. We rst use the encryption algorithm to form
a normal ciphertext CD = ( eC;C0; fCig1in). Then, we
choose a random exponent c 2 ZN . We also choose random
values i 2 ZN associated to keywords. The semi-functional
ciphertext C is set to be eC; C0  gc2; fCi  gci2 g1in :
It should be noted that the values i are chosen randomly
once and then xed - these same values will also be involved
in semi-functional keys which we will dene below.
Semi-functional Key A semi-functional key will take on
one of two forms. To create a semi-functional key, we rst
use the key generation algorithm to form a normal token
key TKP = ((A; ; T ); fK1;j ;K2;jg1j`). Then, we choose
random values j 2 ZN associated with row j of the ` m
matrix A. We also choose a random vector w 2 ZmN and set
j = Aj  w. The semi-functional key of type 1 is set as
((A; ; T ); fK1;j  gj+j(j)2 ; K2;j  gj2 g1j`):
A semi-functional key of type 2 is formed without the terms
g
j(j)
2 and g
j
2 (one could also interpret this as setting j =
0):
((A; ; T ); fK1;j  gj2 ; K2;jg1j`):
We will prove the security of our scheme based on Assump-
tions 1, 2 and 3 using a hybrid argument over a sequence of
games. The rst game, Gamereal is the real security game
(the ciphertext and all token keys are normal). In the next
game, Game0, all of token keys will be normal, but the chal-
lenge ciphertext will be semi-functional. We let q denote the
number of token key queries made by the attacker. For k
from 1 to q and % from 1 to n, we dene
Gamek;1: In this game, the challenge ciphertext is semi-
functional, the rst k 1 token keys are semi-functional
of type 2, the kth token key is semi-functional of type
1, and the remaining token keys are normal.
Gamek;2: In this game, the challenge ciphertext is semi-
functional, the rst k token keys are semi-functional
of type 2, and the remaining token keys are normal.
GameFinal% : In this game, all token keys are semi-functional
of type 2, and the challenge ciphertext CD = (
eC;C0; fC1,
: : : ; Cng) is a semi-functional encryption of D with
C1; : : :, C%, each of which is randomly chosen from
Gp1 Gp2 Gp4 .
For notational purposes, we think of Game0;2 as another
way of denoting Game0 and GameFinal0 as another way of
denoting Gameq;2. In the nal game, GameFinaln , all to-
ken keys are semi-functional, and the ciphertext CD =
( eC;C0; fC1; : : : ; Cng) is a semi-functional encryption with
C1; : : : ; Cn randomly chosen from Gp1  Gp2  Gp4 (thus
the ciphertext is independent of D0 and D1 provided by the
adversary). It is clear that in the nal game, no adversary
can have advantage greater than 0.
We prove that these games are indistinguishable in the
following four lemmas. Therefore, we conclude that the ad-
vantage of the adversary in Gamereal (i.e., the real security
game) is negligible. This completes the proof of Theorem
1.
Lemma 1. Suppose that G satises Assumption 1. Then
Gamereal and Game0 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. Suppose there exists an algorithm A that distin-
guishes Gamereal and Game0. Then we can build an algo-
rithm B with non-negligible advantage in breaking Assump-
tion 1. B is given g;X3; X4; T and will simulate Gamereal
or Game0 with A. B chooses Z;Z0; Z1; : : : ; Zn 2 Gp4 and
; a0; a1; : : : ; an 2 ZN uniformly at random. It then sets u =
ga0 ; h1 = g
a1 ; : : : ; hn = g
an ; U = uZ0; H1 = h1Z1; : : : ; Hn =
hnZn, and sends A the public key:
PK = (N; gZ; e(g; g); U; fHig1in; X4):
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It can generate normal token keys in response to A's token
key requests by using the key generation algorithm, since it
knows the SK = (g; u; h1; : : : ; hn; X3; ).
At some point, A sends B two documents D0;D1. B
chooses  2 f0; 1g randomly and does the following:
1. B chooses random values eZ1;0; f eZ1;ig1in 2 Gp4 .
2. Let D = (s;1; : : : ; s;n). B computeseC = e(g; T ); C0 = T  eZ1;0; Ci = T a0s;i+ai  eZ1;i:
3. B sets the challenge ciphertext as CD = ( eC;C0;
fCig1in) and sends it to A.
If T
$ Gp1 Gp2 , let T = gsgc2, theneC = e(g; g)s; C0 = (gZ)sZ1;0  gc2;
Ci = (U
s;iHi)
sZ1;i  gci2 ;
where Z1;0 = eZ1;0Z s, Z1;i = eZ1;i(Zs;i0 Zi) s, i = a0s;i+
ai. This is a semi-functional ciphertext and B simulates
Game0. We note that the values of a0; s;i; ai modulo p1 are
uncorrelated from their values modulo p2, so this is properly
distributed. If T
$ Gp1 , it is easy to observe that this is a
normal ciphertext and B simulates Gamereal. Hence, B can
use the output of A to distinguish between these possibilities
for T .
Lemma 2. Suppose that G satises Assumption 2. Then
Gamek 1;2 and Gamek;1 are computationally indistinguish-
able.
Proof. Suppose there exists an algorithm A that distin-
guishes Gamek 1;2 and Gamek;1. Then we can build an algo-
rithm B with non-negligible advantage in breaking Assump-
tion 2. B is given g;X1X2; Y2Y3; X3; X4; T and will simulate
Gamek 1;2 or Gamek;1 withA. B chooses Z;Z0; Z1; : : : ; Zn 2
Gp4 and ; a0; a1; : : : ; an 2 ZN uniformly at random. It
then sets u = ga0 ; h1 = g
a1 ; : : : ; hn = g
an ; U = uZ0; H1 =
h1Z1; : : : ; Hn = hnZn, and sends A the public key:
PK = (N; gZ; e(g; g); U; fHig1in; X4):
Note that B knows the secret key SK = (g; u; h1; : : : ; hn; X3,
) associated with PK. Let us now explain how B answers
the jth key query for a predicate (A; ; T = (t(1); : : :, t(`))).
For j < k, B creates a semi-functional key of type 2 by
choosing a random vector v such that 1  v = , a random
vector w0, random exponents ri 2 ZN , random elements
R1;i; R2;i 2 Gp3 , and setting:
K1;i = g
Aiv(ut(i)h(i))
riR1;i(Y2Y3)
Aiw0 ; K2;i = g
riR2;i:
We note that this is a properly distributed semi-functional
key of type 2 because the value of Ai  w0 modulo p2 is un-
correlated to its value modulo p3.
For j > k, B creates a normal token key by running the
key generation algorithm since it knows SK.
To answer the kth key quest for (A; ; T = (t(1); : : :,
t(`))), B chooses a random vector v0 such that v0  1 = ,
a random vector w such that w  1 = 0, random exponentsei 2 ZN , random elements eR1;i; eR2;i 2 Gp3 and sets:
K1;i = g
Aiv0TAiwT ~i(a0t(i)+a(i)) eR1;i; K2;i = T ~i eR2;i:
We have the following observations. If T
$ Gp1Gp2Gp3 ,
then T can be written as grgd2R, and
K1;i = g
Aiv(ut(i)h(i))
riR1;i  gi+i(i)2 ;
K2;i = g
riR2;i  gi2 ;
where v = v0 + rw, ri = r~i, i = dAiw, i = d~i, R1;i =
RAiw+~i(a0t(i)+a(i)) eR1;i, R2;i = R~i eR2;i, (i) = a0t(i) +
a(i). This is a semi-function key of type 1. Note that the
values of ~i; a0; t(i); a(i) modulo p1 are uncorrelated from
their values modulo p2. If T
$ Gp1 Gp3 , this is a properly
distributed normal token key.
At some point, A sends B two documents D0;D1. B
chooses  2 f0; 1g randomly and does the following:
1. B chooses random values eZ1;0; f eZ1;ig1in 2 Gp4 .
2. Let D = (s;1; : : : ; s;n). B computeseC = e(g; X1X2); C0 = (X1X2)  eZ1;0;
Ci = (X1X2)
a0s;i+ai  eZ1;i:
3. B sets the challenge ciphertext as CD = ( eC;C0,
fCig1in) and sends it to A.
If we let X1X2 = g
sgc2, theneC = e(g; g)s; C0 = (gZ)sZ1;0  gc2;
Ci = (U
s;iHi)
sZ1;i  gci2 ;
where Z1;0 = eZ1;0Z s, Z1;i = eZ1;i(Zs;i0 Zi) s, i = a0s;i+
ai. This is a semi-functional ciphertext. Note that the values
of a0; s;i; ai modulo p1 are uncorrelated from their values
modulo p2.
Similar to the analysis in the proof of Lewko et al. 's KP-
ABE scheme [22], the kth key and the challenge ciphertext
are properly distributed. We can thus conclude that, if T
$ 
Gp1 Gp2 Gp3 , then B has properly simulated Gamek;1. If
T
$ Gp1  Gp3 , then B has properly simulated Gamek 1;2.
Hence, B can use the output of A to distinguish between
these possibilities for T .
Lemma 3. Suppose that G satises Assumption 2. Then
Gamek;1 and Gamek;2 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof. Suppose there exists an algorithm A that distin-
guishes Gamek;1 and Gamek;2. Then we can build an algo-
rithm B with non-negligible advantage in breaking Assump-
tion 2. B is given g;X1X2; Y2Y3;X3;X4; T and will simulate
Gamek;1 or Gamek;2 with A. B chooses Z;Z0; Z1; : : : ; Zn 2
Gp4 and ; a0; a1; : : : ; an 2 ZN uniformly at random. It
then sets u = ga0 ; h1 = g
a1 ; : : : ; hn = g
an ; U = uZ0;H1 =
h1Z1; : : : ; Hn = hnZn, and sends A the public key:
PK = (N; gZ; e(g; g); U; fHig1in; X4):
The responses to all key queries and challenge ciphertexts
are the same as in Lemma 2, except that the kth query which
is given below.
To answer the kth key quest for (A; ; T = (t(1); : : :,
t(`))), B chooses a random vector v such that v  1 = ,
a random vector w, random exponents ~i 2 ZN , random
elements eR1;i; eR2;i 2 Gp3 and sets:
K1;i = g
Aiv(Y2Y3)
AiwT ~i(a0t(i)+a(i)) eR1;i; K2;i = T ~i eR2;i:
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We have the following observations. If T
$ Gp1Gp2Gp3 ,
then T can be written as grgd2R, and
K1;i = g
Aiv(ut(i)h(i))
riR1;i  gi+i(i)2 ;
K2;i = g
riR2;i  gi2 ;
where ri = r~i, i = logg2 Y2  Aiw, i = d~i, R1;i =
Y Aiw3 R
Aiw+~i(a0t(i)+a(i)) eR1;i, R2;i = R~i eR2;i, (i) = a0 
t(i) + a(i). This is a semi-function key of type 1. Note
that the values of ~i; a0; t(i); a(i) modulo p1 are uncorre-
lated from their values modulo p2. If T
$ Gp1  Gp3 , this
is a properly distributed semi-functional key of type 2.
We can conclude that, if T
$ Gp1Gp2Gp3 , then B has
properly simulated Gamek;1. If T
$ Gp1 Gp3 , then B has
properly simulated Gamek;2. Hence, B can use the output
of A to distinguish between these possibilities for T .
Lemma 4. Suppose that G satises Assumption 3. Then
GameFinal% 1 and GameFinal% are computationally indistinguish-
able.
Proof. Suppose there exists an algorithm A that dis-
tinguishes GameFinal% 1 and GameFinal% . Then we can build
an algorithm B with non-negligible advantage in breaking
Assumption 3. B is given (g; g2; hX2; hZ0; gsB24; X3; X4; T )
and will simulate GameFinal% 1 or GameFinal% withA. B chooses
Z;Z0; Z1; : : : ; Zmaxf1;% 1g; Z%+1 : : : ; Zn 2 Gp4 and ; a0; a1,
: : : ; amaxf1;% 1g; a%+1 : : : ; an 2 ZN uniformly at random. It
then sets u = ga0 ; h1 = g
a1 ; : : :, hmaxf1;% 1g = g
maxf1;% 1g,
h%+1 = g
%+1 : : : ; hn = g
an ; U = uZ0, H1 = h1Z1, : : :,
Hmaxf1;% 1g = hmaxf1;% 1g Zmaxf1;% 1g, H% = hZ0 (implic-
itly setting h% = h and Z% = Z
0), H%+1 = h%+1Z%+1; : : :,
Hn = hnZn, and sends A the public key:
PK = (N; gZ; e(g; g); U; fHig1in; X4):
Each time B is asked to provide a key for (A; ; T =
(t(1); : : : ; t(`))) (where A is an `  m matrix), B creates
a semi-functional key of type 2 by choosing a random vector
v such that 1 v = , a random vector w, random exponents
ri 2 ZN , random elements R1;i; R2;i 2 Gp3 , and setting:
K1;i =
8<: g
Aiv(ga0t(i)(hX2))riR1;ig
Aiw
2 ; if (i) = %;
gAiv(ga0t(i)+a(i))riR1;ig
Aiw
2 ; otherwise:
K2;i = g
riR2;i:
We note that K1;i can be written as g
Aiv(ut(i)h(i))
riR1;i 
gi2 , where i = Ai w+ ri logg2 X2 if (i) = % or i = Ai w,
so this is a properly distributed semi-functional key of type
2.
At some point, A sends B two documents D0;D1. B
chooses  2 f0; 1g randomly and does the following:
1. B chooses random values eZ1;0; f eZ1;ig%in 2 Gp4 .
2. Let D = (s;1; : : : ; s;n). B chooses random elements
C1; : : : ; Cmaxf1;% 1g 2 Gp1 Gp2 Gp4 and computeseC = e(g; gsB24); C0 = gsB24  eZ1;0;
C% = (g
sB24)
a0s;%  T  eZ1;%;
fCi = (gsB24)a0s;i+ai  eZ1;ig%<in:
3. B sets the challenge ciphertext as CD = ( eC;C0,
fCig1in) and sends it to A.
Let B2; B4 be the Gp2 ;Gp4 parts of B24 respectively. If
T = hsD24, theneC = e(g; g)s; C0 = (gZ)sZ1;0  gc2;
fCi = (Us;iHi)sZ1;i  gci2 g%in;
where c = logg2 B2, Z1;0 = B4
eZ1;0Z s, Z1;% = Ba0s;%4 D4eZ1;%(Zs;%0 Z0) s, fZ1;i = Ba0s;i+ai4 eZ1;i(Zs;i0 Zi) sg%<in,
% = (logg2(B
a0s;%
2 D2))=c, fi = a0s;i + aig%<in, D2; D4
are the Gp2 ;Gp4 parts ofD24 respectively. Note that the val-
ues of a0; s;i; ai modulo p1 are uncorrelated to their values
modulo p2. This is a properly distributed semi-functional
ciphertext with C1; : : : ; Cmaxf1;% 1g random in Gp1 Gp2 
Gp4 . If T
$ Gp1 Gp2 Gp4 , this is a properly distributed
semi-functional ciphertext with C1; : : : ; C% randomly chosen
from Gp1 Gp2 Gp4 .
We can conclude that, if T = hsD24, then B has properly
simulated GameFinal% 1 . If T
$ Gp1 Gp2 Gp4 , then B has
properly simulated GameFinal% . Hence, B can use the output
of A to distinguish between these possibilities for T .
4. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the KP-ABE scheme proposed by Lewko et al.
[22] recently, we presented a new construction of search-
able public key encryption. Our scheme supports arbitrary
monotone boolean predicates. Compared to previous works
in this eld, our construction is more expressive and ecient
and is proven secure in the standard model.
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